The emerging details of the Blackwater shootings

The New York Times and the Washington Post published separate reports today providing details on the September 16 Blackwater shooting incident, however the two reports are not reconcilable, but that may be directly related to the Post’s more detailed account and the quality of the Post’s reporting, which is one of the poorest written news articles I’ve ever read and is confusing at best.

The New York Times account is derived from multiple third-party sources and seemingly provides a summarized outline of events based on combining the information obtained from all sources. It also seems to coincide more with the details provided by witnesses of the shootings and the Iraq Ministry’s description of the incident.

Considering the relative differences in the two pieces, one would have to conclude there is much we still do not know, however the publishing of these articles from confidential sources can hardly be dismissed as coincidental. Who leaked the information and why?

While the two articles focus on details of the shooting, the Times briefly mentions an issue that may have more significance than the actual details of the September 16 shootings.

The American official said that by Wednesday morning, American investigators still had not responded to multiple requests for information by Iraqi officials investigating the episode. The official also said that Blackwater had been conducting its own investigation but had been ordered by the United States to stop that work. Ms. Tyrrell [a Blackwater official] confirmed that the company had done an investigation of its own, but said, “No government entity has discouraged us from doing so.”

What could possibly be so important that it required the government to order Blackwater end its investigation unless it was a simple matter of ensuring no further contact with the Iraqis? And would that be to mitigate hostilities between Blackwater and Iraq or something more complex? Maybe both?

Furthermore, someone is obviously not telling the truth. Is Blackwater so bold as to defy an order from the government, and if they are, that does not by default mean their reasons are wrong. AT&T and Verizon should have followed Qwest’s refusal to comply with the government’s demands to conduct warrantless eavesdropping.

The Times’ report provides a reasonably understandable, but less detailed outline of the events, however their sources are hearsay and not an official document(s), which means the information may be limited and subjective. The Times cites “an American official who was briefed on the American investigation by someone who helped conduct it, and by Americans who had spoken directly with two guards involved in the episode.”

There are only five notable items that are reconcilable between the accounts given by the Times and the Post:

  1. The Iraqi government’s assertion that Blackwater was not provoked;
  2. The approximate time the shootings occurred;
  3. Individuals were killed in a car that was approaching Blackwater’s security convoy;
  4. The location of the shootings;
  5. Some Blackwater employees did not stop shooting until forced to do so at gun point by other Blackwater employees.

The Times reports the detonation of an IED in close proximity to a diplomatic meeting resulted in a quick decision to evacuate the facility and a “Blackwater convoy began carrying the diplomats south, toward the Green Zone.” The Post reports, “three Blackwater teams moved to escort one “principal” back to Baghdad’s Green Zone.”

The shootings occurred at Nisour Square, but the details of what happened there are either limited, as is the case in the NYT account, or confusing based on the WaPo account. The Times reports one Blackwater convoy (three to four vehicles per convoy) escorted the diplomat, and one convoy served as an advance team driving to Nisour Square to clear passage for the diplomatic convoy. The advance convoy was apparently the focal point of the shootings — provoked or not.

From the Times:

At least four sport utility vehicles stopped in lanes of traffic that were entering the square from the south and west. Some of the guards got out of their vehicles and took positions on the street, according to the official familiar with the report on the American investigation.

At 12:08 p.m., at least one guard began to fire in the direction of a car, killing its driver. A traffic policeman said he walked toward the car, but more shots were fired, killing a woman holding an infant sitting in the passenger seat.

…After the family was shot, a type of grenade or flare was fired into the car, setting it ablaze, according to some accounts. Other Iraqis were also killed as the shooting continued.

The Post provides multiple accounts — Iraqi ministry, Blackwater’s report to the Embassy immediately after the shootings, and witness interviews — but given how poorly the piece was written, at various points in the article it is not readily discernable which specific activities are derived from what account. This is an attempt to summarize the U.S. Embassy report (Blackwater’s account).

  • Three Blackwater teams were dispatched to escort “one ‘principal’ ” back to Baghdad’s Green Zone - Team 4, TST 22, and TST 23. A single team normally consists of three to four armored vehicles.
  • The principal/diplomat was in the Team 4 convoy. TST 22 was an additional convoy dispatched to accompany Team 4. It appears the two-team convoy configuration was planned or standard procedure.
  • After the car bomb detonated outside the meeting facility, TST 23 was dispatched to provide additional protection.
  • Team 4 (includes principal) and TST 22 left the meeting location before TST 23 arrived and returned to the Green Zone unharmed.
  • On its way to meet the diplomatic convoy, TST 23 arrived at Nisour Square and became engaged in “small arms fire.” One of the vehicles in the TST 23 convoy became disabled during the shooting.
  • After returning the diplomat(s) to the Green Zone, TST 22 was sent back to Nisour Square to assist TST 22, however TST 23 left Nisour Square before TST 22 arrived.
  • When TST 22 arrived at Nisour Square, they were “confronted by an Iraqi quick-reaction force” and shortly thereafter, “Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police units arrived and began to encircle TST 22 with vehicles, [and] had large caliber machine guns pointed at TST 22.”
  • TST 22 requested help from the U.S. Embassy’s regional security office, which dispatched helicopters from the U.S. Army Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to provide “route reconnaissance and additional coverage.”
  • The U.S. Army’s QRF “mediated” the situation, allowing TST to return to the Green Zone.

One point is clear and common to both the Times and the Post, and at face value illustrates Blackwater was out of control. From the Post:

…Participants in the shooting have reported that at least one of the Blackwater guards drew a weapon on his colleagues and screamed for them to “stop shooting.” This account suggested that there was some effort to curb the shooting, with at least one Blackwater guard believing it had spiraled out of control. “Stop shooting — those are the words that we’re hearing were used,” the official said.

Given the recent allegations of corruption in the Iraqi government and the proven history of corruption in the Bush administration, these press accounts have to be accepted for what they are. The Iraqis could easily be motivated by the desire to replace U.S. private contractors with Iraqi contractors, and who knows what motivations the Bush administration may have beyond ensuring Bush cronies put all the money in their pockets.

Late Update: I’m not sure what the accurate spelling of Nisour/Nisoor is. The Times has “Nisoor” and the Post has ‘Nisour.” Go figure.

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