Political reconciliation continues to fail in Iraq
On January 10, 2007, President Bush told the nation the violence in Iraq, and specifically in Baghdad, prevented the Iraqi government from achieving its political goals and objectives. To rectify the situation, the president said he would send more U.S. troops (the "surge"), which would create a more secure environment and consequently allow the Iraqi government to achieve the primary objective of political reconciliation. But yet again, the president was dead wrong.
In spite of recent military successes, progression in the political arena continues to fail miserably as evidenced by a recent report in the Washington Post.
In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government’s failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but "it’s unclear how long that window is going to be open."
The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? "If that doesn’t happen," Odierno said, "we’re going to have to review our strategy." (Emphasis added.)
Brig. Gen. John F. Campbell, deputy commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, complained last week that Iraqi politicians appear out of touch with everyday citizens. "The ministers, they don’t get out," he said. "They don’t know what the hell is going on on the ground." Campbell noted approvingly that Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, the top Iraqi commander in the Baghdad security offensive, lately has begun escorting cabinet officials involved in health, housing, oil and other issues out of the Green Zone to show them, as Campbell put it, "Hey, I got the security, bring in the [expletive] essential services." (Emphasis added.)
The surge strategy announced in January was approximately the tenth or eleventh strategy Bush has implemented since invading Iraq (iirc), however not one has successfully achieved its primary objective. After several failures and strong opposition from Democrats in Congress, the Decider switched to a position that the commanders in the field would determine what was needed in Iraq and whether "success" was being achieved, but it appears delegating his commander in chief role for political diversion is crumbling as well.
Indeed, after years of seizing on every positive development and complaining that the good news wasn’t being adequately conveyed, American military officials now warn against excessive optimism. "It’s never as bad as it was, and it’s not as good as it’s being reported now," said Army Maj. Gen. Michael Barbero, chief of strategic operations for U.S. forces in Iraq.
Mr. Bush seems to be left with only two options: get out of Iraq or stay the course, killing more Americans, and pass this catastrophe on to the next president in 2009. Of course he has already made his intentions known — let someone else clean up the mess he has created.
Thomas Ricks and Karen DeYoung’s wrote an excellent article. Read it.
