The Political Chase

The administration’s cut-and-run political strategy for Iraq

George W. Bush has repeatedly used the term “cut-and-run” to characterize Iraq war critics that demanded withdrawal of troops (at any level) from Iraq. But now, facing failure of the primary objective in Iraq – political reconciliation – the Bush administration is, to put it mildly, scaling back on political goals for Iraqi unity. George Bush has made himself a huge target for “cut-and-run” criticism. Of course incompetence goes without saying.

 

Like father, like son.

 

The irony of George Bush’s decision to implement a cut-and-run strategy for political reconciliation in Iraq rivals his father’s mantra, “Read my lips: No new taxes.” The elder Bush’s decision in 1990 to raise taxes, and thereby break his 1988 campaign promise, cost Bush 41 a second term in the White House. And the relevance of their decisions are not so much about the specific action taken (or not), as it is about credibility and integrity.

 

In interviews with hundreds of voters around the country in the last five months, the slogan, which was the bedrock of George Bush’s 1988 campaign for President, was uttered time and again by voters angered not so much that their taxes had increased as by their belief that Mr. Bush had lied to them, breaking not a routine promise but a sacred compact.

 

The country rebuked George H. W. Bush 15 years ago for his perceived lack of credibility, but George W. Bush, far surpassing his father in incompetence and lack of credibility, by any measurable means, suffers no consequences for lie after lie, and failure after failure.

 

On January 10, 2007, the president established the objectives of the troop surge and made the expectations clear. Addressing the nation he said:

 

This time, we’ll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighborhoods — and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated.

 

I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people …Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this.

 

[Daily] life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq’s Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace — and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.

 

Furthermore, to insure clarity, the administration prepared nifty little hand-outs for everybody to see how well organized and unambiguous their plan was.

 

Excerpts from Fact Sheet

 

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security

 

 

Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political

 

 

Excerpts from Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review (pdf)

 

Strategic Goals and Objectives

 

 

Key Operational Shifts

 

 

In addition to establishing the objectives and level-setting, the president gave a date-certain for Iraq “to establish its authority,” and also declared “the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November.” But that was just another lie.

 

In spite of the administration’s chest-thumping and ad nauseam assurances of pressure on the Iraqi government, with only five days remaining to complete the task and failure looming, the Bush administration chose to implement a cut-and-run political strategy.

 

The Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections…Instead, administration officials say they are focusing their immediate efforts on several more limited but achievable goals.

 

So, why the cut-and-run? What happened to this grand scheme of Disneyland in Mesopotamia? Where’s the utopia that has been shoved down the throat of the Iraqi and American people? After being told for five years it will not work, the administration and reportedly Baghdad had an epiphany “that military gains alone are not enough to overcome the deep distrust among Iraqi factions caused by nearly five decades of dictatorship and war.”

 

No shit. As if 1,300 years of “deep distrust among Iraqi factions” wasn’t sufficient warning to not stir the pot.

 

But be not fooled by the administration’s new cut-and-run strategy. It has nothing to do with troop withdrawals and everything to do with dismissing the 18 benchmarks the president was legally bound to meet. By law (see Public Law 110-28, Title I, Section 1314), all funding for the war in Iraq was directly tied to Iraq meeting the benchmarks. No benchmarks. No funding. The only exception was for the president to provide independent certification that adequately justified not completing the benchmarks and was deemed acceptable to Congress.

 

The law tying the benchmarks to the funding is too complicated for me to accurately interpret. Under the law, the current funding ended September 30, but I can see where someone might interpret that the benchmark requirement doesn’t necessarily expire on that date. That not withstanding, the administration has taken a “trust me” approach and says it has “not abandoned their larger goals and emphasize the importance of reaching them eventually.”

 

While we wait for “eventually” to come, hopefully before the rapture, the Bush administration is “intensifying its pressure on the Iraqi government to produce some concrete signs of political progress,” and is now referring to the new pressure on Baghdad as “a political surge.” Pray tell then, what did George Bush really mean when he said this in January?

 

I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people…Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this.

 

It meant the same thing then as it does now. Nothing. It’s simply the same promises that will only be met by the same failures. And according to reports, in spite of some military successes, the proven level of political influence the administration has in Iraq today, which is zero, is diminishing. That of course assumes one can do the impossible and grasp one’s mind around that concept. Nevertheless, here it is.

 

There have been signs that American influence over Iraqi politics is dwindling after the recent improvements in security — which remain incomplete, as shown by a deadly bombing Friday in Baghdad. While Bush officials once said they aimed to secure “reconciliation” among Iraq’s deeply divided religious, ethnic and sectarian groups, some officials now refer to their goal as “accommodation.”

 

I know cynicism should be put aside, but this gem is downright laughable. Here’s the real money ticket of Bush’s cut-and-run diplomatic strategy. Replace 160,000 soldiers with 160,000 CPA’s.

 

“We can’t pass their legislation,” a senior American official in Baghdad said. “We can’t make them like each other. We can’t even make them talk to each other. Well, sometimes we can. But we can help them execute their budget.”

 

Great. If that’s all we can do, then just replace 160,000 soldiers with a team of CPA’s, and then leave after a few months.

 

And if that little nugget didn’t make you just tingle all over, this might. It makes about as much sense as Bush’s political capital functioning at sub-zero levels.

 

But with [broad political gains] not yet in sight, Bush administration officials said they hoped approval of a few initial steps might lead to more substantive agreements next year, including provincial elections, which the White House wants to see held before Mr. Bush leaves office in less than 14 months.

 

In January, as President Bush told the world about all the benefits the surge strategy would bring, he added, “To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year.

 

Fear not. The cut-and-run president will have another new strategy ready to roll out just in case Iraq cannot develop its budget and hold provincial elections by January 20, 2009. He’ll fax it in from Crawford to the next President of the United States.